Introduction
Of the 47 sub-Saharan states, only a few have not suffered from coups or civil wars; Cameroon is one of these. It has had two presidents, and the transfer of power was constitutional. In addition, Cameroonian politics have become more liberal in recent years: the single-party system was abandoned in favor of multipartyism, and parallel to the governmental information channels, there is now a lively printed press. In comparison with other African countries, Cameroon is a rare case of pluralism and stability.
But the country has also experienced instability. In the 1960s, the government of Ahmadou Ahidjo faced a rebellion fomented by neo-Marxist guerillas. While the 1970s were a period of relative calm, there were a number of minor disturbances, mainly among students. In the 1980s, President Paul Biya had to deal with an assassination plot and an open military rebellion, and in the 1990s, as I will show later in more detail, political protest has been frequent. Political unrest is not uncommon in Africa, but in the case of Cameroon there is an interesting blend of stability and instability ? a phenomenon closely related to what contemporary political scientists identify as neopatrimonialism. It is a highly personal and clientelistic type of rule involving the massive redistribution of state resources.
As French scholars pointed out as early as the 1970s, neopatrimonialism is a form of governance typical of Cameroon but also of most African countries (Médard 1977: 35-84) . More recently, American political scientists have taken a closer look at Cameroon and at neopatrimonialism, mainly in the context of regime change or the recent attempts at democratization. In the early nineties, Nicolas van de Walle wrote an article on neopatrimonial regime transition that made specific reference to Cameroon (1994: 129-57) , and three years later he and Michael Bratton published a general -and impressive -study on the role of 2 neopatrimonialism in regime transition (1997: 61-96) .
According to Bratton and van de Walle, neopatrimonialism typically produces both stability and instability, thereby creating a veritable dilemma. By constructing extensive clientelistic networks to maintain power, African presidents create a degree of stability, but the massive use of state resources required to meet clientelistic needs helps to undermine the very stability that the system generates. Van de Walle therefore concludes that such political systems are not only economically ineffective but also produce the tensions that result in demands for change (1994: 131) .
While this is no doubt true, the African experience shows that the combination of stability and instability can vary greatly. Nigeria, Cameroon's direct neighbor, has all the characteristics of a neopatrimonial regime and suffers from the same inherent dilemma -yet much more dramatically. Compared to many other African countries, Cameroon has managed its neopatrimonial dilemma in a relatively conservative fashion. On the negative side, this has resulted in what Bratton and van de Walle call a 'flawed' transition, because liberalization has not led to democracy (1997: 120), but on the positive side, some of the excesses typical of other countries were avoided. Not for the first time, Cameroon manages to 'muddle through' by exhibiting a degree of sluggishness in both politics and economics that is astounding and that calls for explanation. The purpose of this article is to find a possible answer by isolating factors that might account for the peculiarities of the country's politics. Basically I will stay within the framework developed by Bratton and van de Walle, because I consider it highly useful. On one or two points, however, it will be necessary to deviate and to show the unique features of Cameroonian politics.
The article has four parts. Since neopatrimonial rule is an intricate mixture of politics and economics, the article will focus on the political economy of Cam-3 eroon. For the purpose of this essay the term comprises politics, economics and public administration, the latter being of particular importance for an understanding of the neopatrimonial dilemma. The first part, therefore, is devoted to politics in the narrow sense of the term and contains a brief summary of its main features and some of the more important events. The story has been told many times and in more detail (Prouzet 1974; Bayard 1985) , but a brief summary is necessary in order to make the argument.
In the second part I will sketch Cameroon's economic troubles, and in the third, the focus is on the poor performance of public administration or the lack of 'good governance'. The information stems in part from Cameroonian publications, which have recently become more numerous, and from my own sources.
They also emante from the World Bank and from a recent study by Jeffrey Sachs of the Harvard Institute for International Developmental. In the fourth and final part, the various strings are pulled together in order to discuss the peculiarities of the Cameroonian neopatrimonial dilemma.
Politics
Compared to most of its neighboring countries, Cameroon is a political success story. Nigeria and Chad have known civil war and several coups d'états; the Central African Republic is practically a failing state in which France has intervened on a regular basis; Equatorial Guinea has experienced brutal dictatorship, a situation that has still not much improved. Only Gabon to the south enjoys similar peace and stability. Cameroon's two presidents to date, Ahmadou Ahidjo (1960-82) and Paul Biya (1982-) , have both managed to keep the country from joining the ranks of failing states. Before discussing the problems of Cameroonian politics, it is important to highlight some of the obvious achievements. As if such diversity were not enough, the country was also divided along ideological lines at the time of independence. The communist-inspired Union des
Populations du Cameroun (UPC) was in violent revolt against the Ahidjo regime, which was backed by de Gaulle. The president's first task was to build up a strong army and to put down a guerilla war. From the beginning, Ahidjo's rule was autocratic (Jackson and Rosberg 1982: 152-56) Under Ahidjo, presidentialism meant the almost total concentration of power around one person and one institution -'la présidence' (Prouzet 1974: 151-86; 5 Bayart 1985: 141-59). As a true pater familias, Ahidjo saw himself as the father of the new nation and as the 'guide suprême' who would lead it toward development. He cultivated the image of a stern and proud person regularly 'lecturing' to the nation over the radio. Compared to other African presidents, his personal life style was modest, but when he appeared in public a few luxurious Mercedes and a score of BMW motorcycles were 'de rigeur'. He carried various official and unofficial titles, and once he had been to Mecca, 'El Hadj' was added to the others.
There was a pronounced personality cult, and Ahidjo seemed to consciously promote an image of mystique and secrecy (Prouzet 1974: 230-34 shows at the provincial level, where the more important positions are deliberately assigned to representatives of all 'départements'. Furthermore, and in order to promote integration, regional provincial offices are often headed by non-locals (Ngayap 1983: 68-87 ).
This has not prevented both Ahidjo and Biya from appointing friends from their own ethnic groups to head some of the more sensitive posts, particularly in the area of security. In contrast to some other countries, however, power in Cameroon has never been monopolized by one ethnic group. Ahidjo was a Muslim from the 7 north (Foulbé), and Biya is a Christian from the south (Bëti), but their tribes always shared power with others. From the vantage point of many critics, the problem in Cameroon is not that one group 'has its hand in the public till' -but that all of them do! This is not atypical of neopatrimonialism and clientelistic networks, but in Cameroon the art has reached unprecedented levels of perfection. It has the advantage of pacifying a highly complex polity but entails the obvious disadvantages of waste, mismanagement and economic stagnation.
If tribalism has not driven Cameroon apart, it is nonetheless a most powerful political force. The existing equilibrium is real but also precarious, and ethnic thinking penetrates all spheres of life, including government, parties and newspapers (Mbock 1990: 66-110) . Elite pluralism is not spontaneous but has to be enforced from the top. This is facilitated by a heavy degree of power centralization. In a true neopatrimonial state there is no room for political autonomy of any sort;
federalism and multipartyism therefore had to be abolished. 4 The existence of a modern civil society is equally incompatible, because it implies autonomous intermediary groups willing to engage in political decision-making. To this day, Cameroon has no forceful professional organizations, unions, bar associations or human rights movements (Bratton and van de Walle 1997: 147-49, 249-55) .
Autonomy is at most associated with the discretionary and arbitrary exercise of public office.
In 1982, to everyone's surprise, Ahidjo voluntarily resigned and handed power over to his Prime Minister, Paul Biya. It was one of those rare cases of constitutional power transition in Africa, although within eighteen months Biya had to fight off a conspiracy and a coup d'état by the Presidential Guard. He handled both situations without the excessive use of force (Eboua 1996; Ndi Mbarga 1993: 11-26; Le Vine 1986: 20-52) . When it comes to having recourse to violence, there is a clear distinction between clientelistic autocrats and ruthless dictators. Both Ahidjo and Biya belong to the former and not the latter (Jackson and Rosberg 1982: 14-82 (Banock 1992: 27-47; Ndi Mbarga 1993: 122-242) .
According to Bratton and van de Walle, it is typical of neopatrimonial rule that demands for political liberalization are initiated by the masses and not the elites, through public protest rather than elite pressures (1997: 83) . That is what happened in Cameroon; the fiscal crisis and economic stagnation hurt the masses more than the ruling circles. To be sure, some disgruntled members of the elite did join the opposition forces, but by and large Biya managed to maintain elite cohesion. This is an important point in understanding the peculiarities of Cameroonian neopatrimonialism, and I shall discuss it further in part four of this essay.
As a result of the protests, the political system was liberalized. The details of the process have been described in detail elsewhere (Takougang and Krieger 1998: 115-58; Mehler 1997: 95-138; Eboussi Boulaga 63-163 But, and this must be emphasized, it is a simplification to argue that the three 10 major parties divide neatly along ethnic lines and reflect 'tribalism'.
The first contested elections were held in 1992. In March there were parliamentary and in October presidential elections. In the former elections, the RDPC failed to obtain a majority, 88 of 180 seats, but Biya managed to form a coalition made up of representatives of minor and divided parties, amongst them exponents of the formerly rebellious UPC. 7 The UNDP won 68 seats and remained in the opposition. John Fru Ndi boycotted the legislative elections, which meant that the SDF was not represented in the National Assembly from 1992 to 1997. But Fru Ndi decided to run personally in the fall presidential elections against Biya -and almost won. Officially Biya obtained 40% of the vote, Fru Ndi 36%, and Maïgari 19%. It is fair to assume that had it not been for massive manipulation of the vote Fru Ndi would have won (Ndi Mbarga 1993: 204-42; Onana 1994: 119-29) .
The feeling that Biya and the governing coalition were not playing by democratic rules was reinforced by the municipal elections of January 1996. It was the first time in Cameroon's history that local elections were contested, and officially the RDPC did well. It secured 219 'mairies', the SDF 62, and the UNDP 29 (Le Messager 1996a). Many expected that the freely elected mayors and city councils would finally obtain real power. But disappointment followed: in the larger cities, where the opposition often has its strongholds, the government continued its practice of imposing a presidentially appointed 'délégué urbain' who exercises the real power. Once more the impression prevailed that Biya and his entourage were unwilling to accept the people's will. The legal battles that followed only served to confirm that idea.
The ruling elite did not intend to lose control over major cities. Perhaps for good reason, because the opposition had on various occasions been trying to organize massive urban strikes, called 'villes mortes', in English 'ghost towns' (Ndi Mbarga 1993: 155-68; Banock 1992: 56-64) . In 1991, the action was relatively 11 successful, although accompanied by violence; however a second attempt in May 1996 failed. An analysis of these protest movements shows that they were local as much as national in character, and that besides ethnic factors, changing demography also played a role. This cannot be said of the presidential elections held on October 12 -they were boycotted by the SDF and the UNDP. 9 As a result Biya won an easy victory obtaining, according to official figures, 92.5% of the vote (Jeune Afrique Economie 1997b). Given the high turnout (around 80%), the boycott seems to have backfired on the opposition parties. Since they could not agree on a coalition during the campaign, it is quite possible that the opposition perceived a boycott as the second-best solution, but the strategy did not pay off. Fru Ndi in particular has lost popularity, because his zig-zagging has been a bit too willful (Onana 1994: 106-10 
Economics
Generally speaking, the years from independence to 1985 are considered to be an era of growth, whereas the ten years that followed are identified with the 'crise'.
Only recently has there been another upswing. However, under closer examination things look different. Growth was always artificial, because it was mostly induced by government-promoted projects that in the meantime have largely failed. The standard of living for most Cameroonians is no better today than what it was at the time of independence. One cannot but agree with Bratton and van de
Walle that in the long run, neopatrimonial rule is incompatible with growth. Let us look at Cameroonian economics in more detail.
Under Ahidjo the official development policy was planned liberalism. As a follower of de Gaulle and of France, the president consciously rejected socialism.
Cameroon, in contrast to many other African countries, never opted for the neo-Marxist road to development; it was always regarded as staunchly 'capitalist'.
That did not prevent the state from being heavily involved in all aspects of economic life. A 'ministère du plan' would draw up Five-Year-Plans that, as one of their main purposes, facilitated the flow of outside assistance. As Jean-Claude Willame says, planned liberalism "was more a shopping list of desirable public sector investment projects for interested financing bodies and industrialists than the rigorous exercise in integrated financial, economic, and social allocation it 13 was theoretically intended to be" (1986: 112).
The idea of buying turn-key industries was part and parcel of clientelism and the massive distribution of state resources. It tied the elites to the president by providing them with jobs, contracts and licenses; in return they had to demonstrate loyalty by participating in the political rituals of the UNC. As Willame implies, the Cameroonian elite preferred shopping to real development; after all, consumption is easier than production.
10 By such methods, Cameroon set up around 150 enterprises with varying degrees of state participation; in most cases the state owned a controlling interest (Tedga 1990: 125-135) . The companies were meant to supplement private initiative or to substitute for it where lacking. In reality, the enterprises frustrated private domestic initiative and often prevented the few truly modern managers from rising.
Also, through planned liberalism the country was supposed to increase its independence by means of import substitution while initiating the diversification of imports, a strategy that has failed in many parts of the world. When oil revenues began to flow into the state till in the late 1970s, planned liberalism had its heyday. The state invested heavily in a number of ambitious industrial projects, and its international credit position promptly began to worsen.
Paul Biya inherited a large public sector. The state was the single most important employer; an enormous bureaucracy was in place that was supposed to manage development. According to van de Walle, state payrolls exploded from less than 20,000 at the time of independence to around 250,000, including perhaps 80,000
in the parastatal sector (1994: 143) . Under Biya the policy changed but only in name; it was now called communitarian liberalism (Ndi Mbarga 1993: 88-99) .
The period ended in 1985, when suddenly, and for a number of reasons, the economy went into a ten-year tailspin.
Reliable statistics are difficult to obtain in sub-Saharan countries, and consequently it is nearly impossible to characterize the crisis in quantitative terms.
When figures are cited anyway, they must be viewed with caution. However, according to the World Bank, real per capita GDP was cut in half between 1986 and 1993 (1995: 6) , and for Rettinger, who uses figures from four different sources, the situation in 1992 was back to where it had been in the mid-1970s (1998: 17) .
Since the economy deteriorated further until 1995/96, we can understand why many felt that post-independence growth had been totally wiped out.
The financial sector was in particular difficulty (Rettinger 1998: 143-47 1995: 20) . Furthermore, most public financial institutions were settled with so many poor loans that they, too, could not conduct normal business. The loans were largely those from parastatals, of course, which is a fair indication that political considerations were more important than commercial ones (Jeune Afrique Economie 1998b; Mutations 1997a).
To this day, the major obstacle to growth is lack of credit. In the past few years, total investment has been at an all-time low. Private investment, too, has sharply declined and often emanates from informal sources. Public investment, which in the early 1980s averaged 15% of the GDP, was down to 2.2 % in 1993. Today, Cameroon's rate of investment is substantially below the sub-Saharan average and far inferior to that of East and Southeast Asian countries (World Bank 1995: 9-30).
The overblown public sector has become a tremendous burden on the economy.
Most state and parastatal enterprises are running heavy deficits and are hurting the economy. The World Bank, which usually uses diplomatic language, for once speaks plainly. It calls the financial results of public enterprises 'disastrous' and 15 accuses them of 'bleeding' the private sector (World Bank 1995: 21, 26; Rettinger 1998: 124-43; Tedga 1990: 11) .
This had been predicted for some time. The management of most public companies was poor, and particularly the various agro-industrial projects were in trouble from the start. A number of them never even got off the ground (Fotso 1994: 159-64; Tedga 1990: 160-72) . Insiders knew of the problems. Jean-Claude Willame, as early as 1986, showed that a whole string of Cameroonian parastatal enterprises was in great difficulty and that governmental policy was seriously flawed (1986: 111-132) . Furthermore, as Willame adds, "the decision-making process has been pervaded by a lot of corruption generated at all levels, including the top of the administration, which was highly successful... in keeping government business under tight secrecy" (1986: 130). In the 1980s such criticism was rare, but today it is common, especially among ordinary Cameroonians! Of course, economic decline also had its foreign sources. It is true that world market prices for some export crops fluctuated and that agriculture suffered. But that does not explain the wholesale disintegration of parastatal ventures, many of which have no ties to the world market whatsoever. Even the oil refinery constructed outside Limbe, and meant to supply Cameroon with its own cheap source of energy, has been a burden rather than a blessing to the country's economy.
Given the catastrophic performance of the public sector and the difficulties under which the private sector operates, it is no wonder that the informal sector is growing (ILO 1993: 5-6 The need for a structural reorganization of Cameroon's economy is obvious.
During the 1997 elections, John Fru Ndi's SDF demanded a thorough liberalization of the economy, but the impetus for reform comes mainly from outside, from the IMF and the World Bank. As part of a debt-rescheduling effort, Cameroon agreed in September 1988 to a first Structural Adjustment Program (Mehler 1995: 295; Ndi Mbarga 1993: 125) . As has become the rule, such programs include commercial, monetary, budgetary and structural m easures. Cameroon's compliance was reluctant; of the four IMF agreements entered into up to 1996 none has been implemented as planned. Small wonder that the country has gained a reputation as a very disappointing 'adjuster' (Mehler 1995: 296) .
In 1994, finally, abolishing export levies and price subsidies on traditional export crops liberalized commerce. In January 1994, a much needed currency devaluation took place, and exports have since increased. Budgetary discipline has remained uneven, but apparently the government pay roll has been reduced and tax collection improved. In typical Cameroon fashion, restructuring is proceeding at a snail's pace. In 1995, the government announced plans to liquidate over 60 public enterprises and to privatize another 100 at a rate of 10 per year, but no names or dates were published (World Bank 1995: 36-37 The impact of these liberalization measures is as yet difficult to assess. Andreas Mehler, writing in 1995, is convinced that the effort has utterly failed (1995: 295). It is too early for a final verdict, however. If the announced program of privatization is carried out, it is bound to have some positive effects. But SAP assessments in other African countries show that overall results are disappointing unless restructuring ist accompanied by a serious domestic commitment for reform. Sociologically speaking such efforts would have to be supported by local entrepreneurs and an emerging middle class. In Cameroon there is a respectable indigenous commercial class, and many business people have become prosperous. But given the clientelistic nature of politics, their business methods are equally personal. Credit, difficult to obtain from formal sources, is often organized informally among the members of the same clan or ethnic group, and since the courts cannot be relied on for the collection of debts, many transactions are in kind or cash.
Public Administration
As There is little doubt that from the viewpoint of investors the country rates extremely low and that governmental and institutional weaknesses are especially pronounced. In short, Cameroonian public service -including the legal system -is in no position to provide a framework for growth, let alone a framework for general social justice. In fact, the country suffers from the triple evils of excessive governance, bad governance and non-governance. All three are intertwined, of course.
By excessive governance, the sheer size of Cameroonian bureaucracy is meant 19 and, directly related to this, its cumbersome procedures and unnecessary red tape.
Many public offices are plainly overstaffed. The general secretariat of the National Assembly, to mention just one example, is packed with clerks who have no work for most of the year. It is true that the country inherited the unwieldy and highly hierarchical French system of administration, starting with the 'chef du quartier' and reaching upward via 'maire', 'sous-préfet', 'préfet', 'gouverneur', 'ministre de l'administration territoriale', 'présidence' to, finally, the 'Président de la République' himself. But not everything can be blamed on the former colonial masters, because in France the same structures produced 'un état fort' instead of 'un état mou'. Furthermore, the French themselves have shown that their institutions can be adapted and become less rigid and centralized. The Cameroonians could have gone through the same learning process. After all, in the last forty years, hundreds of high-ranking Cameroonians have attended seminars all over the world and have been taught how to structure and manage modern bureaucracies -to no visible effect. The neopatrimonial 'culture' is too powerful (Médard 1979: 56-67, 74) .
The enormous size of the civil service becomes glaringly visible every evening on national television: endless numbers of 'fonctionnaires' are shown attending pompous functions, generally to install one of their own in a new position. In the days of Ahidjo, such events were usually dedicated to the initiation of a new development project -that quickly degraded. There are fewer projects to inaugurate these days, and the ceremonies now appear to be largely self-congratulatory.
Keeping plenty of uniformed officials is one of the state's important reasons for being.
Excessive governance is compounded by the addition of bad governance, which embraces both incompetence and corruption. Like many African countries, Cameroon experienced a shortage of civil servants immediately after independence.
The Africanization of the 'fonction publique' happened quickly, however, but the 20 production of competence did not keep up with the rate of appointments. As Willame argues, the deplorable history of state and parastatal enterprise can be explained in good part by sheer incompetence (1986: 130-32) . The problem is not only a lack of training but also of arbitrary appointments. Some 'haut fonctionnaire' is always building up his own personal network of clients with little regard for qualifications or experience.
The situation is worsened by corruption. Private enrichment at public cost is routine in Cameroon, especially now that government salaries have been cut drastically in some instances; university professors, for instance, earn up to a third less.
If one is to believe newspaper reports, corruption is very common at almost all levels of government ( Mutations 1996; Mutations 1997b) . Members of the 'présidence' and ministers and directors of public enterprises make off with large amounts of money; lowly officials have to make due with small amounts. 13 In order to improve its credibility, the government launches anti-corruption campaigns at regular intervals.
Terms like kleptocracy or prebendalism are used to characterize the situation (Andreski 1970: 346-57) . Whatever the label, the situation creates profound injustices. If 'everyone can be bought' the rich literally enjoy all the rights, and the poor obtain none. Equality and the idea of a public good become a farce, and the consequences for administration -and for economic growth -are disastrous. periods of intensive activity are followed by periods of total calm -and neglect.
Instead of being systematic, government activity is intermittent and nonsustained.
There is much dynamism while a project is being initiated, and there is even more fanfare at its inauguration, but then 'dégradation' sets in. Physical and institutional decay is the rule, regular maintenance is the exception. As a result, the country is littered with institutional ruins, with agencies and buildings that have become dysfunctional. For Richard Sandbrook and for Christopher Clapham political decay is an omnipresent danger in Africa (Sandbrook 1985: 40; Clapham 1996: 161-274) . I have already mentioned the general secretariat of the National Assembly; the Cameroonian Chamber of Commerce is yet another example, but many foreign sponsored development projects could also be cited. Even presidential residencies are suffering from neglect and ruin. Two former palaces, the colonial palace in the center of Yaoundé and Ahidjo's 'fortress' on top of Mont Fébé, are empty and falling apart.
During the last two years Cameroon has come under increasing pressure to reform its public administration. In July of 1997, the government signed an agreement with UNDP to conduct a comprehensive study of the situation and to elaborate recommendations for a program on good governance (Jeune Afrique Economie 1998d). It is too early to know the specifics of the program, and its implementation is several years off. However, what we do know about administrative 22 reform in general is that external stimuli can only bear fruit when powerful internal support is forthcoming and neopatrimonial rule is scaled down. Whether this is the case in Cameroon remains to be seen. Cameroon's neopatrimonialism, therefore, produces its own pressures for regime change, and in this respect the country's performance is once again quite typical.
Neopatrimonialism and Cameroon
As Bratton and van de Walle argue, it is the institutional legacy that determines neopatrimonial regime transition more than economic or international factors (1997: 41-45, 272-79) . This is certainly true for Cameroon, where public unrest and the demand for political change occurred against the background of the 'crise'. This term has both an economic and a political dimension, and most would agree that the trouble is homemade. Most newspapers express this same perspective, and only an occasional official would disagree.
As a consequence, the regime change that occurred after 1992 closely follows the 23 eight phases distinguished by Bratton and van de Walle. In the years prior to 1992 a crisis in political legitimacy (1) gradually built up, mainly because Biya's promises of improvement and liberalization had come to nothing. The discontent became manifest when a public protest (2) led by John Fru Ndi broke out in Bamenda. Initial government response (3) was negative; the protest was put down by force, and there were casualties. Next there was a politicization of the demands (4) raised by the Bamenda protesters, which entailed elite erosion in the sense that former insiders jumped onto the SDF bandwagon or started their own political parties.
Biya then undertook some political reforms (5) by legalizing the establishment of parties and by liberalizing the press. This was a limited move and often meant 'one step forward, two steps back' (6), because the actual exercise of the rights involved was constantly hampered. The demand for a national conference was denied, and instead there was a Tripartite Conference. The negotiations ended in constitutional reform (7) introducing innovations like greater regionalization, but reform was also seen as a dilatory move. In the meantime, Biya called for early presidential elections (8) and, as Bratton and van de Walle show, these cannot be categorized as 'founding elections' because the voting was neither free nor fair, the incumbent was not ousted, and the loser did not accept the result (1997: 197, 201-06) . It was a case of 'rapid elections' meant to manipulate the transition in favor of the incumbent (Bratton and van de Walle 1997: 175-77).
Cameroon's transition was consequently flawed -some liberalization occurred, but democratization failed. The crucial election of 1992 was not accepted by the oppositon, and the 'big man' stayed in power. No wonder that the local press runs headlines like "multipartisme: déjà! démocratie: pas encore" (Challenge 1996).
Most Cameroonians fully realize that the process was flawed and that no real transition was taking place. 24 If democracy is defined as more than the mere winning of elections, the results are more modest yet. Some authors think democracy should imply the existence of a democratic mentality, a large middle class and a strong civil society; in short, a veritable democratic culture. By these standards it becomes even more obvious that Cameroon is far from being a democratic polity. Of the three stages of transition -liberalization, democratization and consolidation -the country remains within the first. Samuel Huntington is far off the mark when, based on completely unrepresentative GNP figures, he considers Cameroon to be well on the road to democracy and in the same league with Tunisia, Mexico or Malaysia (1991: 313) .
GNP statistics are no substitute for careful conceptual analysis and on the spot observation.
There is little doubt that most Cameroonians want democracy, and there is also no question that a change of power based on fair elections would be important for the country's development, particularly for the promotion of good governance.
But given the deeply engrained neopatrimonial culture prevailing in all of sub-Saharan Africa, the introduction of democracy faces immense obstacles (Joseph 1997: 363-82) . It is not surprising that much of the progress achieved between 1990 and 1994 has already been reversed or, as Bratton and van de Walle conclude, is "eroding" (1997: 233; Baker 1998: 115-27) . The most probable outcome of the transition process, therefore, is not democratization or consolidation, but what the two authors call survival. It is an intermediate result located between a "reversal to authoritarianism" and "the difficult process of consolidation" (Bratton and van de Walle 1997: 235).
For Bratton and van de Walle, survival is again largely determined by the institutional legacy mentioned earlier, which in turn is characterized either by political participation or political competition. Experience with competition is considered more important for survival than a history of mere participation. Cameroon, unfortunately, has more experience with participation than with competiton. Ahidjo 25 ended competitive elections when he set up the single-party system in 1972; from then on, Cameroon went through the usual "mass rituals of political participation" (Bratton and van de Walle 1997: 273) . The legacy is not ideal, but the odds for the survival of the present multiparty system and for incremental improvements are relatively good. This means that in the foreseeable future, the country will live with imperfectly contested elections and relatively free print media.
So much for the model developed by Bratton and van de Walle. Cameroon is an amazing fit, but there are a few peculiarities that the theory cannot account for. This is not a fault of theory since, as Kenneth Waltz told us many years ago, it deals with general categories and is not meant to explain and predict every single instance (1979: 1-17). It is quite an achievement, therefore, if the theory of Bratton and van de Walle is relevant for description, analysis and prediction of general phenomena. Yet there are variations and special cases among the 47 sub-Saharan states -and Cameroon is one of them.
It is not entirely surprising that Cameroon should merely 'survive' and embark on a middle course between reversal and consolidation, between a return to outright authoritarianism (including a possible military takeover) and real progress toward democracy. As mentioned earlier and as shown in terms of economic policy, Cameroon has an astounding record of muddling through, or of incrementalism, to use a term from the vocabulary of Bratton and van de Walle (1997: 273) . How can this be explained?
It is my thesis that Cameroonian sluggishness is related to its cultural diversity. While these two could be called typical defectors, the case of John Fru Ndi is different. He had never been in public office, let alone a minister or member of parliament. He had never had his 'hand in the till' and did not want to return to power. As a bookseller from anglophone Bamenda, he was a strictly local figure.
It is just because of his modest background that he was much admired for having stood up to Biya. 'Le chairman' is a colorful populist who tends to campaign in pidgin, the lingua franca in a region so heavily split by colonial history -but it is not the language of the elite and national politics! It is true that various 'returnees' jumped on the SDF bandwagon, but it was Fru Ndi who confronted Biya in the crucial 1992 presidential elections and who almost won. The people voted for a fresh face and not for a typical defector.
It is also important to mention that as an anglophone and a Bamenda, Fru Ndi comes from the Grassfields and is ethnically close to the francophone Bamiléké.
He consequently managed to find followers not only among his own people but also among large numbers of the Bamiléké at home or in the larger cities to which they have migrated. But, and this is crucial, Bamenda and Bamiléké elite defection was anything but massive. To many of his own elite members, John Frun Ndi remained 'an outsider among the outsiders' with whom they had difficulty identifying. A few discussions with officials in Baffoussam, the major city of the Bamiléké region, will convince any visitor of this fact.
To obtain a feeling for the excruciatingly complex ethnic situation, it is necessary to know more about the Bamiléké factor in Cameroonian politics. These peoples live in tightly knit and hierarchically organized communities called 'chefferies'
and practice animistic cults. At home in the hilly Grassfields, they are successful farmers and produce a number of crops that they can export as far as Gabon.
Many have become wealthy businessmen in the most diverse trades, but a good number have also gone into government and the professions. This has drawn them into the larger cities where, like most groups, they tend to live in their own 28 'quartiers' while keeping in close touch with the 'chefs' at home (Warnier 1993: 19-196 (1994: 148) . The question is how important: did the state elites, on the whole, accelerate the reform process or did they help Biya to stall?
Were they pushing for a 'national conference' or were they behind the Tripartite Conference? It would be normal for many to behave in an opportunistic fashion, but the available information suggests that on the whole they were more conservative than rebellious.
This takes me back to the central argument: elite defection was anything but massive, even among the Bamiléké, and the main opposition leader was not even a typical defector (Mehler 1997: 102-25 (Fogui 1990: 197-347 Such a president is in no hurry to implement 'structural adjustment'. He does not rush into negotiations with anyone, including France and the IMF. He also does not mind being seen as a 'poor adjuster' or 'poor privatizer'. The same applies to handling corruption: the 'prince' is tolerant and extremely patient, but once he acts the culprit is expelled in no uncertain terms, although one day he may be forgiven and reinstituted. Administrative reform is also slow. A dramatic reduction in the government payroll would not only endanger clientelism but damage the image of a beneficient lord as well.
Seen from this perspective ethnic diversity has the advantage of excluding dra-matic options and of promoting incrementalism and 'survival'. It is no guarantee, however, for the resolution of the contradictions between politics, economics and administration. Ethnic diversity alone does not resolve the basic neopatrimonial dilemma. Ahidjo and Biya have walked a precarious line between stability and instability -which both helped to produce. 1 Tribal, cultural and racial terms are often mixed when enumerating the many peoples;
Prouzet speaks of racial groups and mentions "bantous, semi-bantous, hamites, sémites, soudanais" (see Prouzet 1974: 10) . Federalism is a constant issue in Cameroonian politics, which shows in the fact that the newly amended constitution makes provision for the creation of a second chamber, a Senate, intended to represent the various regions more strongly (see Bratton and van de Walle 1997: 77-82) . 5 On the general issue of civil society in Africa see Harbeson, Rothchild and Chazan 1994: 1-100. As Sandbrook points out, there is also no class base for strong associations; Africa has at best embryonic classes (1985: 68) . See also Eboussi Boulaga 1997: 317-433. 6 Today there are about 20 regularly published newspapers, many of them weeklies. The An amnesty allowed exponents of the formerly rebellious UPC to return from exile and to run for office. Some "upécistes" made it into parliament, and some were given important government jobs. However, quarrels tore the party apart, so that today the once proud opposition group is hardly a serious challenger. For more details on the party's history see Zang- This decision came as a surprise to many since, after the parliamentary election, the SDF formed a common front with the president's Rassemblement in choosing the leadership of the new Assembly. Biya's party got the presidency and three of the five vice-presidential posts, and the SDF obtained the remaining two. In addition, the SDF obtained the chairs of some committees (Jeune Afrique Economie, 14 July 1997, pp. 34-36; 6-19 October 1997, pp. 74-78) . The "discretionary state" is often cited as the worst enemy of growth -and the predictable and transparent enforcement of rules is said to bit its best friend. Fore more details see Borner, Brunetti and Weder 1994; 12-13: Rettinger 1998: 167-250. 13 Allegations about corruption at highest levels are common; anti-corruption campaigns are also frequent. In 1997, the Edzoa Tituts affair was making headlines. For many years Edzoa was very close to Biya, served as his personal doctor and occupied some of the most influential positions. In a move that surprised everyone, he voluntarily resigned from his post as
Minister of Public Health ? only to announce that he was running for president! A few weeks later he was arrested. Rumors about improper financial dealings had been circulating for 37 years. For details, see Jeune Afrique Economie, 20 October -2 November 1997, pp. 80-84. 14 The port of Douala is a typical example. The Douala Port Authority became so inefficient that the government decided to hand important functions over to the Société Générale de Surveillance (SGS), operating internationally out of Geneva: Le Messager, 2 January 1997, p. 6, "La SGS à l'heure du bilan". But that alone did not help, and in the meantime more serious measures have had to be taken; see Jeune Afrique Economie, 2 -15 February 1998, pp. 34-35. 
